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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬃciency impacts of private toll roads in initially untolled networks.
The analysis allows for capacity and toll choice by private operators, and endogenises entry
and therewith the degree of competition, distinguishing and allowing for both parallel and
serial competition. Two institutional arrangements are considered, namely one in which
entry is free and one in which it is allowed only after winning an auction in which
patronage is to be maximised. Both regimes have the second-best zero-proﬁt equilibrium
as the end-state of the equilibrium sequence of investments; but the auctions regime
approaches this end-state more rapidly: tolls are set equal to their second-best zero-proﬁt
levels immediately, and capacity additions for the earlier investments are bigger. When
discreteness of capacity is relevant and limits the number of investments that can be
accommodated practically, the auctions regime may therefore still result in a more
eﬃcient end-state, with a higher social surplus, although the theoretical end-state is the
same as under free entry.
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1.0 Introduction
Over recent decades, there has been an increasing interest in private
involvement in road infrastructure supply. One important reason is that
declining government budgets motivate the search for alternative funds
for ﬁnancing desired road-capacity expansions. In addition, there is a
rather widespread belief that the private sector would be inherently more
eﬃcient and innovative than their public counterparts, so that private
roads may be built and operated at lower costs than public ones. Another
consideration could be that the public at large may accept the imposition of
tolls, generally believed to be important in curbing traﬃc congestion, more
easily from private than from public operators.
There are, however, also potential economic hazards in the private
supply of road capacity. Particularly, private toll-road operators would
typically be interested in maximising proﬁt rather than social surplus,
and socially optimal ﬁrst-best pricing cannot be expected from them —
particularly, because the control of a road (section) will usually imply a
certain degree of market power. The impacts on the private operator’s
price setting has been studied, for instance, by Edelson (1971), Mills
(1981), Mohring (1985), Verhoef et al. (1996), Verhoef and Small (2004),
and De Palma and Lindsey (2000). One recurring and probably not so sur-
prising conclusion from such studies is that proﬁt-maximising private road
operators typically set congestion tolls above the optimal level: the proﬁt-
maximising toll not only internalises marginal external congestion costs,
as the eﬃcient toll does, but adds to this a monopolistic demand-related
mark-up that rises as demand becomes less elastic. In addition, even
though a proﬁt maximiser has an incentive to oﬀer the socially optimal
amount of capacity given the prevailing level of demand, overpricing
reduces demand, and hence the private supply of capacity is generally
below the optimal level (for some further discussion, see, for example,
Small and Verhoef, 2007).
Most studies of private road supply take the number of private suppliers
as given. Usually only one operator is considered, sometimes a duopoly (for
example, as in De Palma and Lindsey, 2000), but only seldom more. This
may lead to a somewhat pessimistic picture of the eﬃciency of private
toll roads: DeVany and Saving (1980) and Engel et al. (2004) show how
proﬁt-maximising tolls fall as the number of parallel competitors increases,
approaching the optimal value as ﬁrms become inﬁnitesimally small and
competition becomes perfect. The limited attention for this theoretical
benchmark result can probably be explained by the fact that perfect com-
petition, with many parallel competitors, seems a rather theoretical
option, due to the lumpiness of road infrastructure in practice.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 42, Part 3
464
It is not only just the number of competing private road suppliers that
determines overall eﬃciency; it is also their distribution over the network.
Small and Verhoef (2007, Ch. 6) illustrate this in a simple example, by
studying how tolls and social surplus will vary if a road of a given capacity
and length is split up and divided over an increasing number of symmetric
private competitors in two contrasting cases: when they compete in parallel
as substitutes versus when they compete in series as complements. In
accordance with the two studies just mentioned, they ﬁnd that the tolls
approach the optimal level, which just internalises marginal external con-
gestion costs, when the number of parallel competitors approaches inﬁnity.
Eﬃciency thus rises with the degree of competition. In contrast, when the
number of serial competitors increases, so does a road user’s aggregate
toll (for using all serial road segments), and eﬃciency then falls with the
number of competitors. These ﬁndings are in accordance with insights
that Economides and Salop (1992) provide into the eﬃciency eﬀects of
mergers between serial and parallel ﬁrms in network markets. When look-
ing at competition in network markets, it is important to consider explicitly,
therefore, the conﬁguration of the network and the distribution of com-
petitors over that network — and in particular to distinguish between
serial and parallel competition; that is, competition between substitutes
and complements.
Besides competition, auctions for the right to operate a toll road can
also be designed so as to improve the overall economic eﬃciency from
private toll roads. Engel et al. (1996), for example, argue how a Net Present
Value auction may be used to circumvent problems of renegotiation under
demand uncertainty. Verhoef (2007) studies how the criterion used for
selecting the winning bid in an auction can aﬀect the eﬃciency of the result-
ing equilibrium. The classic criterion of the maximum bid pushes bidders
towards the monopolistic proﬁt-maximising toll and capacity, with the
associated negative impacts on eﬃciency, and therefore does not seem to
be very attractive from the social viewpoint. Perhaps surprisingly, when
the winning bid is deﬁned as the one that maximises the use or ‘patronage’
of the new road, the result will correspond with the second-best zero-proﬁt
combination of toll and capacity for the new link. That is the most eﬃcient
outcome for which one could reasonably hope when there is unpriced con-
gestion elsewhere on the network (which is why it is second-best), and no
subsidies are granted to private road operators bidding competitively
(which is why a zero-proﬁt constraint applies).
Verhoef (2007) derives these results for a ﬁrst tolled link at an exogenous
location in an otherwise untolled network. A natural follow-up question,
addressed in this paper, is whether this ‘patronage auction’ retains its
attractive properties in a more generalised setting. A ﬁrst generalisation
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is that also the location of the link to be supplied will now be part of the
auction, because the franchise will be granted to the bidder that can attract
the largest number of users to a new link, irrespective of its location in the
network. A second generalisation is that we will now consider a sequence of
auctions, each of which can be won by incumbents or entrants, so that entry
into the network is introduced endogenously when new ﬁrms make the best
bids. There are two natural benchmarks against which we can judge the
performance of such a sequence of auctions. A ﬁrst is a free-entry sequence,
for which we assume that at each stage, a new link is added by the ﬁrm who
realises the highest proﬁts from doing so, and who sets the proﬁt-maximis-
ing capacity and toll.1 A second one is the sequence where at each stage, the
socially most desirable link is added, with the second-best optimal capacity
and toll. Both benchmarks will be considered in this paper. It brings us to
the realm of sequential modelling of network evolution, a topic that has
recently been addressed also by Levinson and Yerra (2006) and Zhang
and Levinson (2006).
This paper thus studies the eﬃciency impacts of private roads in initially
unpriced (hence public) networks. We allow for capacity and toll choice by
private operators, and endogenise entry and therewith the degree of compe-
tition, allowing for both parallel and serial competition. Two institutional
arrangements are considered, namely one in which entry is free and one in
which it is allowed only after winning an auction. A number of simplifying
assumptions are made for the dual purposes of keeping the analysis
manageable and keeping the model transparent, so that an economic
interpretation of the results is more easily given. The main assumptions
are the following. The congestion externality forms the only relevant
market failure. We consider identical road users, and ﬁrms that are
equipped with identical cost functions for providing road capacity. There
are neutral economies of scale in road construction and the congestion tech-
nology exhibits constant returns to scale (that is, the travel time functions
are homogeneous of degree zero in traﬃc volume and capacity). Capacity is
a continuous variable, but we will address qualitatively the question of how
results might change when capacity would become discrete, as it is usually
thought to be in reality. Auctions are perfectly competitive: there are no
strategic interactions between bidders during the bidding phase and the
1An anonymous reviewer remarked that this free-entry sequence could therefore also be interpreted as a
sequence of ‘classic’ bid-maximising auctions at each stage. It is true that at each stage, the resulting
capacity addition and toll would be the same for both sequences. A main diﬀerence would be that
under competitive bid-based auctions, the payment of the bid immediately exhausts the proﬁts, so
that a ﬁrm would typically run into losses after additional parallel capacity is auctioned oﬀ at a
later moment (this will in fact be illustrated later in Figures 6 and 7). For that reason, we will maintain
the terminology and interpretation of a free-entry sequence versus a sequence of (patronage) auctions.
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winner will realise a zero proﬁt from carrying out the bid. Evidently, each of
these assumptions is debatable empirically, and may thus oﬀer worthwhile
extensions for further research. The present paper deliberately focuses on
this simpliﬁed environment, in the hope of deriving transparent results
that are indicative of the main economic forces in this type of problem,
which will remain relevant also in a more complex setting that allows for
some of the complications just mentioned.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
the main assumptions underlying it, and discusses some analytical back-
grounds. Section 3 describes the numerical version to be used in this
paper. Section 4 contains the simulation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2.0 Model Set-up
2.1 Network conﬁguration
We will consider what is probably the simplest possible network conﬁgura-
tion that allows us to incorporate interactions between both serial and
parallel roads in a network. This conﬁguration is portrayed in Figure 1.
There is a single market for trips between one origin (A) and one destina-
tion (B). The road ‘corridor’ between these locations consists of two
serial segments a and b, which are connected through an uncongested
crossing X.
Initially, there is only untolled capacity on both segments; these are the
‘initial links’ that will be denoted as links a0 and b0. We will study how new
links are added to these on both segments, under diﬀerent institutional
‘regimes’. Note that the initial capacities can be set to zero without prob-
lem, so that absence of initial untolled capacity is just a special case of
the proposed model.
Each new link covers either segment a or segment b, and is connected to
the same crossingX. Because road users consider parallel links to be perfect
substitutes, ‘Wardropian’ equilibrium conditions apply on both segments
individually. This means that the generalised price faced by users, to be
Figure 1
The Initial Network with Untolled Links on Segment a and Segment b (Upper Diagram), and
a Possible Later Conﬁguration after some Links have been Added (Lower Diagram)
A B
Segment a Segment b
Segment a Segment b
X
A BX
Initial network:
Network with some
parallel links added:
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deﬁned below, must be equalised on all links on a segment that can carry
traﬃc, and cannot be lower on unused links for that segment (Wardrop,
1952). The lower diagram shows a possible network conﬁguration after
three links have been added; two on segment a and one on b. The dashing
in the drawing aims to reﬂect that one ﬁrm has become active on both seg-
ments, and a second ﬁrm only on segment a. The exclusion, by assumption,
of possible direct roads between A and B serves to maintain the original
network structure with substitute and complement roads; allowing for
more structural changes in the network conﬁguration is an interesting
generalisation for future study.
We consider stationary-state congestion and assume that road users are
homogeneous. Their inverse demand for travelling between A and B is
given by the inverse demand function D(N), in which N denotes the
number of trips per unit of time (or traﬃc ﬂow).
The average user cost on a certain link l includes all variable costs
incurred by the users, including travel time, and depends, through conges-
tion, on the link ﬂow Nl and the link capacity Kl. It is denoted clðNl;KlÞ.
The generalised price faced by users of a link l, plðNl;KlÞ, is equal to the
sum of clðNl;KlÞ and a toll tl (if levied). Every possible route r uses two
links, one on each segment, so that the number of possible routes is
equal to the product of the numbers of links on segments a and b. Equili-
brium is characterised by the following Wardropian conditions:
8r :
pa;rðN;Ka;rÞ þ pb;rðN;Kb;rÞ DðNÞ5 0
Nr5 0
Nr  pa;rðN;Ka;rÞ þ pb;rðN;Kb;rÞ DðNÞ
 
¼ 0
8>><
>>:
N ¼
X
r
Nr;
ð1Þ
where N is the vector of route ﬂows. Note that a certain link l may carry
users from multiple routes, so that the generalised price for a link used
by route r may depend on more route ﬂows than just Nr (but, of course,
not necessarily on all route ﬂows). The composite superscript s,r denotes
the speciﬁc link l that route r has on segment s. With condition (1) satisﬁed,
the generalised prices for all used routes are equalised in equilibrium, and
are equal to marginal beneﬁts D(N). Because users can freely choose com-
binations of links from segments a and b, the equilibrium conditions (1)
imply that on both segments the generalised prices for all used links must
be equalised.
Assuming that the social objective is to maximise social surplus, deﬁned
as user beneﬁts minus user cost minus capacity cost, we can next ﬁnd the
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socially optimal or ‘ﬁrst-best’ values of Kl and tl by maximising, subject to
condition (1):
S ¼
Z N
0
DðnÞdn
X
l
Nl  clðNl;KlÞ 
X
l
Cc;lðKlÞ; ð2Þ
where Cc;l is the capacity cost for link l. Because a link ﬂowNl is the sum of
all route ﬂows Nr for routes that use that link, and aggregate ﬂow N is the
sum of all route ﬂows together, objective (2) can be maximised with respect
to all route ﬂows to ﬁnd the short-run optimality conditions (these condi-
tions also apply in the long-run optimum, in which capacity is also
optimised). This produces ﬁrst-order Kuhn–Tucker conditions that will
not be written out, because they look very similar to conditions (1). The
only diﬀerence is that ps;r is replaced by mcs;r: the (short-run) marginal
user cost on link s,r. Observe that mcl, in turn, is the sum of the generalised
average cost cl and the marginal external cost mecl ¼ Nl  @cl=@Nl:
mcl ¼ @N
l  clðNlÞ
@Nl
¼ cl þNl  @c
l
@Nl
: ð3Þ
Because pl ¼ cl þ tl, the following tolls will consequently achieve short-run
optimality:2
tl ¼ Nl  @c
l
@Nl
: ð4Þ
These are conventional ‘Pigouvian’ toll expressions, equal tomec, as can be
found in nearly every transport economics textbook (for example, Small
and Verhoef, 2007).
Optimal investment rules are found by optimising objective (2) with
respect to link capacities Kl, which gives:
Nl  @c
l
@Kl
¼ @C
c;l
@Kl
: ð5Þ
The economic interpretation of equation (5) is straightforward: the
marginal beneﬁts of capacity expansion (the left-hand side), consisting of
reduced aggregate user cost, should be equal to the marginal cost (the
right-hand side). A few relatively straightforward manipulations are
2Optimal toll vectors need not be unique; in the current network, a constant could, for example, be
added to all tolls on segment a and subtracted from all tolls on segment b without changing the equili-
brium, so that equation (4) does not hold for any link but the optimum is nevertheless achieved. When
demand is not perfectly inelastic, all optimal toll schedules produce the same aggregate route tolls, so
that the total toll paid (over the full trip) by any individual is the same, irrespective of which among the
possible optimal toll patterns is applied. The toll rule of equation (4) is, of course, the most natural and
intuitive among these toll patterns.
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suﬃcient to conﬁrm the well-known ‘self-ﬁnancing’ result of Mohring and
Harwitz (1962).3 This result implies that when: (i) capacity is continuous,
(ii) there are neutral economies of scale in road construction (that is, the
marginal cost on the right-hand side of equation (5) is constant), and (iii)
the congestion technology exhibits constant returns to scale (that is, the
travel time functions are homogeneous of degree zero in traﬃc ﬂow and
capacity), the total toll revenues equal the total cost of capacity when equa-
tions (4) and (5) are both satisﬁed for all links. The optimal road network is
then exactly self-ﬁnancing: the proﬁts pl on each link l are all zero. This
result is especially signiﬁcant in the context of the present paper, because
it means that if free entry of ﬁrms, and competition between them, even-
tually leads to a zero-proﬁt outcome, this need not be inherently inconsis-
tent with a ﬁrst-best equilibrium. The same holds for a sequence of
competitive auctions that drives down proﬁts to zero. Nevertheless, because
there are many possible combinations of tolls and capacities that produce a
zero proﬁt, zero proﬁts are of course not a suﬃcient condition for
optimality.
Throughout this paper, it will be assumed that the above conditions (i)
to (iii), underlying the exact self-ﬁnancing result, are satisﬁed. However,
because we will allow for the continuing existence of unpriced and conges-
tible initial capacity, the ﬁrst-best outcome will generally be unattainable.
The existence of unpriced congestion will for a parallel tolled link cause a
downward adjustment on second-best tolls compared to Pigouvian tolls,
so as to reduce congestion spill-overs (for example, Le´vy-Lambert, 1968).
In contrast, it typically creates an upward bias on the toll on a serial
link, which is adjusted in an attempt also (partially) to internalise down-
stream or upstream congestion. As shown in Verhoef (2007), the existence
of unpriced congestion on parallel or serial links does, however, not aﬀect
the second-best investment rules for newly added priced capacity. Con-
sequently, the investment rule (5) remains valid for a tolled link with
unpriced parallel or serial congestion, while the toll rule of (4) does not.
The consequence is that second-best investments and pricing then
do not generally result in exact self-ﬁnancing of newly added tolled capa-
city, simply because this would require (4) and (5) to be both satisﬁed.
3The ﬁrst step is to multiply both sides of equation (5) by Kl . Because, by Euler’s theorem,
Kl  @cl=@Kl ¼ Nl  @cl=@Nl when c is homogeneous of degree zero as we assume, the left-hand
side of equation (5) is then equal to total toll revenues. After the said multiplication by Kl , the
right-hand side of equation (5) gives total capacity cost when the marginal cost of capacity
@Cc;l=@Kl is constant. Exact self-ﬁnancing thus applies. The Mohring–Harwitz result is in fact more
general than this, and states that the degree of self-ﬁnancing (the ratio of total revenues and total capa-
city cost) is equal to the elasticity of the capital cost function with respect to capacity (see also Small
and Verhoef, 2007).
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Equivalently, when free entry or auctions cause long-run proﬁts on tolled
roads to become zero, while unpriced initial capacity remains available,
the resulting equilibrium cannot be second-best (which has a non-zero
proﬁt or loss). At best, it would correspond to the ‘second-best zero-
proﬁt’ conﬁguration (‘second-best’ because there is unpriced congestion
elsewhere in the network; ‘zero-proﬁt’ because the new capacity is restricted
to produce a zero surplus). In our analysis below, we will therefore use both
the ‘ﬁrst-best’ and the ‘second-best zero-proﬁt’ conﬁguration as bench-
marks for assessing the performance of the free-entry regime and the
auctions regime.
2.2 Game-theoretic set-up in the ‘free-entry regime’
Let us next turn to the assumed game-theoretic set-up for the ‘free-entry
regime’, for which it is assumed that operators are free to add capacity to
the network, and are free in setting tolls. Before discussing various aspects
of this regime in greater detail, it is useful to sketch the more general struc-
ture. A sequence of two-stage games is considered, where each two-stage
game deﬁnes a ‘round’ in the sequence (the initial equilibrium is ‘round
0’). The second stage in such a game involves Bertrand toll competition
between road operators. The ﬁrst stage involves capacity choice for a
single added link: it is assumed that in each round, only one link can be
added to the network. Of course, there are multiple candidate road opera-
tors and multiple candidate locations (that is, segment a or b) for such an
added link. For each candidate operator–link combination, the described
two-stage game will be solved, and it is assumed that the operator–link
combination that implies the highest proﬁt gain for the associated operator
is the one that will materialise. We then move to the next round; that is, the
next two-stage game. Note that there is thus full rationality within each
two-stage game, while we assume myopia between two-stage games. Let
us now turn to the more detailed assumptions and, where needed, their
justiﬁcation.
First, we assume that all ﬁrms have access to the same technology, and
face the same user cost functions clðNl;KlÞ and capacity cost functions Cc;l.
Next, to account for the sequential character of network development in
reality, we choose to consider a sequential game, with only one capacity
addition in each round, instead of a game where all potential ﬁrms
simultaneously decide how much capacity to add on which segment. The
moments at which investments are made are exogenously determined in
our model. We thus ignore the optimal timing of investments; we do this
for simplicity and acknowledge that it oﬀers an important possible exten-
sion of the present model. Exogenous timing could be relevant in reality
Private Roads: Auctions and Competition in Networks Verhoef
471
when the government would not allow multiple road construction projects
to be carried out simultaneously.
Between capacity additions, the network conﬁguration is given and the
ﬁrms then present play a Nash–Bertrand game when setting their tolls. This
means that they set their tolls t so as to maximise their proﬁt p, treating as
given any other operators’ tolls, as well as all link capacities. Note that this
means that a ﬁrm operating more than one link sets all his tolls simulta-
neously, so as to maximise his aggregate proﬁt, summed over all his links
together.
Bertrand toll-setting behaviour of road operators, as assumed here,
seems intuitively more plausible than a Cournot model, where players
would assume that the ﬂows on the competitors’ links are ﬁxed. Bertrand
competition is therefore common in network models of competing
operators (for example, De Palma and Lindsey, 2000; De Borger et al.,
2005). Furthermore, Nash behaviour seems a more neutral starting point
than having a Stackelberg leader on the network, but this is another issue
that may warrant further study (for example, Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008,
compare Nash versus Stackelberg behaviour in a two-stage game-theoretic
model of two competing governments supplying tolled infrastructure,
and ﬁnd that in their model the diﬀerence between the two types of
competition is much more pronounced in the toll stage than in the capacity
stage).
We now turn to the ﬁrm’s behaviour when considering whether or not to
invest and add capacity to the network. In fact, it is not so straightforward
to choose an appropriate speciﬁcation. A strict adherence to Nash beha-
viour might lead to a model in which it is assumed that a ﬁrm would not
expect other ﬁrms to change their tolls in response to its own investment
— even though the addition will make a non-marginal change to the
network. However, this seems a rather naive assumption, especially if it
is commonly known from earlier investments that ﬁrms do adjust their
tolls when the system moves from the one Nash equilibrium to the other.
This is why we use the two-stage set-up in each round, which implies that
a ﬁrm realises that after it will have invested, a new Nash equilibrium in
tolls will result.
Each ﬁrm, incumbent, or entrant, is assumed to calculate, for both
segments of the network, for which level of investment the increase in its
proﬁts between the current and the new Nash equilibrium is maximised.
If the ﬁrm invests in a certain round, it will then choose that segment
and that capacity level that produces the highest proﬁt gain. However,
only one of these candidate investments will be made in each round and
we assume that it is the one by the ﬁrm that has the highest proﬁt gain
from investing in that particular round. The motivation for this assumption
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could be that in the absence of entry barriers, the ﬁrm expecting the largest
proﬁt would be that most likely to invest when only one addition can be
made. When deciding on capacity additions, ﬁrms are therefore ‘nearly-
myopic’: when investing, they optimise by looking no further than the
immediate post-investment Nash equilibrium — but they do predict this
equilibrium correctly.
It is important to acknowledge that there is some inconsistency in
assuming, on the one hand, that the ﬁrm realises that, in the second
stage, other forms will change their tolls after it has made an investment,
and, on the other, assuming that the ﬁrm will nevertheless not set its toll
and capacity on the new link as a Stackelberg leader. There are two reasons
for accepting this inconsistency. One is that we prefer to leave the consid-
eration of Stackelberg behaviour in investing and toll setting for later
study, having Nash behaviour as the natural benchmark. The second is
that it seems equally (or even more) inconsistent to assume that a ﬁrm
behaves as a toll-leader when planning an investment, but next voluntarily
moves to the role of follower when a next investment is made, by another
ﬁrm.
Finally, note that the assumption of nearly-myopic behaviour, rather
than forward-looking behaviour, is again consistent with Nash behaviour,
in the sense that it prevents ﬁrms in our model from setting capacities
strategically — that is, so as also to aﬀect capacity choice by future entrants
in the network; but it does leave open a question of ‘regret’. In particular,
an undesirable property of a predicted equilibrium sequence of entries
would be that at some moment along the sequence, one of the ﬁrms
would regret earlier decisions, because it starts running into losses. We
shall see that this does not occur in our model: proﬁts will never fall
below zero, which is due to our neutral-scale-economies assumptions.
Therefore, although proﬁts will fall over time, there is never a reason to
regret having entered the market. Moreover, we will see that in the long-
run end-point equilibrium, all proﬁts will have fallen to zero, so that all
ﬁrms will have become indiﬀerent with respect to the capacity they chose
when making their investments. The assumption we make on the sequential
process is therefore not too harmful, in the sense that it does not lead to
persisting diﬀerent proﬁtability levels for individual ﬁrms.
2.3 Auctions
The second regime of interest is the ‘auctions regime’. For this regime, we
assume that there is a sequence of auctions in which the right to build a
single tolled link on either segment a or b is granted to the ﬁrm that
makes the best oﬀer. As in the ‘free-entry regime’, we thus have a sequence
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of equilibria, in successive ‘rounds’, at the beginning of which the network
conﬁguration is changed because a single link is added on either segment a
or b. Following Verhoef (2007), we consider ‘patronage-maximising’
auctions, which in his model reproduce the second-best zero-proﬁt out-
come. With this auction, the right to build and operate a new addition to
the network is granted to the ﬁrm that oﬀers to carry the highest traﬃc
ﬂow on that new piece of capacity. We assume that bidding ﬁrms commit
to a particular combination of capacity and toll, and that these imply a
level of patronage for the new capacity which the regulator can calculate
correctly, and use to determine the winning bid. We also assume that
neither the toll nor the capacity can be changed when further capacity
additions are made to the network later on. There is, therefore, no direct
toll competition between ﬁrms.
The patronage-maximising auction is ‘proﬁt-exhausting’, at least for
ﬁrms who are not yet active in the network: under competitive auctioning,
as we will assume to apply, it pushes newly entering ﬁrms to make an oﬀer
that produces a zero proﬁt on the new capacity (Verhoef, 2007). It is impor-
tant to realise that every traveller on the new link carries, as a ‘generalised’
price, the sum of average user cost and, through zero-proﬁt tolling, average
capacity cost. When a bid successfully maximises the use of the link, it must
have minimised this sum of average user cost and average capacity cost.
The auction therefore induces such newly entering operators to enter
‘according to the long-run cost function’ as we will call it. This means
that the post-investment ﬂow on the new link is served against minimised
social cost. In other words, the ﬁrst-best investment rule of equation (5)
will apply. Because neutral scale economies apply, the accompanying toll
that produces zero proﬁts is also the ﬁrst-best toll, given in equation (4),
and its value is independent of the scale of operations. Therefore, the toll
level is the same as it would be in the long-run ﬁrst-best optimum, and
the capacity is the one that minimises social cost for the post-investment
ﬂow level on the link.
Because only one right is granted in each ‘round’, the set-up induces
ﬁrms again to behave nearly myopically, in the sense that they are asked
only to maximise the immediate post-investment patronage of the new
capacity. When further capacity additions follow later on, they should
keep the toll to which they have committed unchanged, but the resulting
changes in patronage are not considered to be a violation of their earlier
bids.
We again face the question of whether ﬁrms may run into losses at a
later stage because of the capacities they choose and the tolls to which
they have committed. Because new entrants will always enter according
to the long-run cost function, and will do so only when demand is large
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enough to prevent losses from doing so, and because Wardrop equilibrium
conditions imply that equal tolls on parallel links will lead to equal travel
times and hence equal ﬂow/capacity ratios on these parallel links, earlier
investors need not fear losses as long as they have committed to the
long-run ﬁrst-best toll level.
As explained, new entrants, with no capacity from earlier investments,
will indeed choose that toll level; but what about a ﬁrm that already has
capacity on the serial segment? Because the ﬁrm is committed to the toll
set earlier on its serial — say, downstream — link, its proﬁt on that down-
stream link increases when the use of that link increases after an investment
on the upstream segment raises the equilibrium ﬂow N. As a result, the
ﬁrm’s aggregate proﬁt, over both segments together, may be maximised
at a patronage level for the new upstream link that exceeds the level consis-
tent with entry according to the long-run cost function. This bid would then
win from bids according to the long-run cost function, as new entrants
would make; but it may involve a toll level below the long-run ﬁrst-best
level, and will then lead to negative proﬁts after further additions on
both segments, by other ﬁrms, would drive average cost and generalised
prices to their long-run ﬁrst-best levels on the links competing with those
of the ﬁrm under consideration. The ﬁrm would then regret its earlier toll
bid. We assume that ﬁrms will not make such bids, and apply a lower
bound on the tolls they bid that prevent the investment from becoming
loss-generating in the future.4 Eﬀectively, this means that all capacity
additions will be according to the long-run cost function.
2.4 Second-best zero-proﬁt entries
Finally, we brieﬂy characterise a sequence of link additions that we call the
‘second-best zero-proﬁt entries’ sequence. This sequence is a relevant
benchmark for judging the auctions regime. It involves a sequence of capa-
city additions that are chosen such that each addition has the maximum
possible contribution to social surplus, under the constraint that the toll
4In the numerical analysis below, this assumption is ‘binding’ but has only limited consequences. The
lower limit becomes binding in round 4, but only if links a1 and a2 would be operated by the same
ﬁrm. That ﬁrm would then oﬀer a higher patronage for link b2 than implied by entry according to
the long-run cost function, namely 132 versus 109, at a slightly lower toll level: 2.761 versus 2.789.
In round 5, also an operator with only a single link, namely b1, would oﬀer a higher patronage for
a3 than implied by entry according to the long-run cost function: 77 versus 12, again at a slightly
lower toll level: 2.712 versus, again, 2.789. These diﬀerences in tolls are conceptually signiﬁcant, as
they indicate that the auctions regime and the second-best zero-proﬁt regime are not formally identical
in terms of their results if we do not add the assumption that ﬁrms will not bid tolls that will imply
losses in a later phase. However, the size of the diﬀerences is negligible in the present model, especially
because the auctions sequence is already very close to the end-state in round 4.
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and capacity produce a zero proﬁt on the added capacity — at least
before any further capacity addition is made to the network. This sequence
allows us to verify whether Verhoef’s (2007) ﬁnding that the patronage-
maximising auction produces the second-best zero-proﬁt road for a ﬁrst
auctioned road, in an exogenously speciﬁed network, remains valid for a
sequence of auctions in a network, which develops in an endogenous
manner through these auctions.
3.0 A Numerical Model
5
We will illustrate the relative performance of the three ‘regimes’ of interest
by using the results from a numerical simulation model. The model is very
similar to that used in Verhoef (2007), and the discussion in this section
closely follows his exposition. The model is rather stylised, but still it is
calibrated so as to be representative for peak-hour highway congestion.
The average user cost function cl takes on the well-known BPR (Bureau
of Public Roads) form (see, for example, Small and Verhoef, 2007):
cðNl=KlÞ ¼ a  tf  1þ b 
Nl
Kl
 !w !
: ð6Þ
The parameter a represents the value of time, and is set at 7.5 in our model,
close to the value (in Euros) currently used for oﬃcial Dutch policy
evaluations. The parameter tf represents the free-ﬂow travel time, and is
set at 0.25 for both segments a and b, implying a total trip length of
60 km for a 120 kilometres per hour highway. Finally, b and w are param-
eters that are set at 0.15 and 4, respectively; these are conventional values
for the BPR-function.
The units of capacity are chosen such that a conventional traﬃc lane
corresponds to Kl ¼ 1,500. This implies a doubling of travel times at a
use level of around 2,400 vehicles per lane per hour. This is roughly in
accordance with the ﬂow at which, empirically, travel times are twice
their free-ﬂow values for a single highway lane, and the maximum ﬂow
on a lane is reached (for example, Small and Verhoef, 2007, page 74,
Figure 3.3). A maximum ﬂow as such, however, is not deﬁned for BPR
functions. Note that the BPR function exhibits constant returns to scale
in congestion technology: the underlying travel time function is homo-
geneous of degree zero in Nl and Kl.
5The exposition in this section draws heavily from Verhoef (2007).
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Next, capacity cost is assumed to be proportional with capacity, so as to
secure neutral scale economies in road construction:
Cc;lðKlÞ ¼ g  Kl: ð7Þ
The unit price of capacity, g, is set equal to 3.5 for both segments. Because
our unit of time is one hour, this parameter reﬂects the hourly capital costs.
To derive a value from empirical highway construction cost estimates, we
have to make an assumption on whether the model aims to represent
stationary traﬃc conditions throughout a day, or during peak hours
only. Our parameterisation concerns the latter. The value of 3.5 was
derived by dividing the estimated average yearly capital cost of one
highway lane kilometre in The Netherlands (€0.2 million)6 by 1,100 (220
working days times ﬁve peak hours per working day; assuming two
peaks), and next by 1,500 (the number of units of capacity corresponding
with a standard highway lane), and ﬁnally multiplying by 30 (the number
of kilometres corresponding with a free-ﬂow travel time of 15 minutes).
Only welfare eﬀects in peak hours are therefore considered in our model,
and it is assumed that oﬀ-peak travel is so modest that both the optimal
oﬀ-peak toll and the marginal beneﬁts of capacity expansion would be
negligible. To maintain consistency, no relevant welfare eﬀects are assumed
to arise outside the peak, and therefore also no toll revenues are supposed
to be raised.
Because ﬁrms are assumed to have access to the same technology, the
cost functions of equations (6) and (7) apply, with equal parameters, to
all ﬁrms — incumbents and entrants.
Finally, it is assumed that a linear inverse demand function applies:
DðNÞ ¼ d0  d1 N: ð8Þ
We choose d0 ¼ 61:27 and d1 ¼ 0:01167, together with initial capacities
Ka0 ¼ Kb0 ¼ 1,500, to obtain a suﬃciently congested benchmark equili-
brium, that allows a reasonable number of further capacity additions in a
sequence of investments. The initial equilibrium road use of N ¼ 3,500
causes equilibrium travel time t to be around 5.4 times the free-ﬂow travel
time tf , which is high but empirically not unreasonable (it corresponds to
a speed of around 22 kilometres per hour for a 120 kilometres per hour
road). The equilibrium demand elasticity e is equal to 0.5 in the initial
6With an inﬁnitely-lived highway, without maintenance and an interest rate of 4 per cent, this implies
investment costs of €5 million per lane-km, or €8 million per lane-mile. This order of magnitude is
reasonably in accordance with ﬁgures that Litman (2006) presents for the USA. He quotes diverging
estimates that suggest that the median investment cost per lane mile would be in the range of $5 to
10 million; more than a third exceeds $10 million.
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equilibrium, while it will be equal to0.21 in the second-best zero-proﬁt out-
come. Averaging over the extremes of the range of use levels considered in
our analysis, we therefore ﬁnd a reasonable 0.35.
Table 1 provides the values of some of the model’s key variables in a few
benchmark equilibria. First, as a matter of notation, note that in Table 1 we
use a slightly diﬀerent double index to distinguish links than before, the ﬁrst
character (a or b) still indicates the segment, but now the second character
identiﬁes the individual link on that segment. A single index a or b refers to
aggregates for a segment, summed over all its links.
The ‘base equilibrium’, in the ﬁrst column, is as described above.
Because no tolls are charged, the operator’s proﬁts p on both segments
are negative, reﬂecting the capacity cost of the initial capacity. The general-
ised price in the ‘ﬁrst-best’ optimum is nearly 50 per cent lower, despite the
imposition of a toll. This is a consequence of the capacity expansion, which
is in relative terms substantially bigger than the increase in traﬃc ﬂow. As
anticipated, both segments have a zero proﬁt in the ﬁrst-best optimum.
Next, the ‘second-best’ equilibrium, in which the initial capacity remains
unpriced but the new capacity is tolled, has a remarkably high social sur-
plus. The relative eﬃciency indicator o, deﬁned as the increase in social
surplus compared to the base equilibrium, relative to the increase obtained
through ﬁrst-best pricing and capacity, amounts to 0.97. This is due to the
Table 1
Key Characteristics of some Benchmark Equilibria
Base
equilibrium First-best Second-best
Second-best
zero-proﬁts
Maximum
added capacity
(zero-proﬁts)
S 60,983 109,466 108,204 98,966 92,133
o 0 1 0.974 0.783 0.643
pa0;pb0 5,250 0 5,250 5,250 5,250
pa1;pb1 – – 7,382 0 0
pa; pb 5,250 0 12,632 5,250 5,250
Ka0;Kb0 1,500 3,452 1,500 1,500 1,500
Ka1;Kb1 – – 2,234 1,209 1,456
Ka;Kb 1,500 3,452 3,734 2,709 2,956
ta0; tb0 0 2.789 0 0 0
ta1; tb1 – – 0.156 2.789 4.145
ca0; cb0 10.212 2.572 2.728 5.362 6.163
ca1; cb1 – – 2.572 2.572 2.018
D ¼ p 20.424 10.723 5.456 10.723 12.326
Na0;Nb0 3,500 4,331 1,979 2,815 2,964
Na1;Nb1 – – 2,803 1,517 1,230
Na;Nb;N 3,500 4,331 4,783 4,331 4,194
Note: Due to the assumed symmetry, equilibrium values for segments a and b are equal for all
relevant variables, and are therefore shown in a single row.
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fact that the initial capacity is very low, so that the expansion of capacity
brings substantial net beneﬁts. Because the second-best toll is below the
marginal external cost on the new capacity, a deﬁcit now results.
Imposing a zero-proﬁt condition, as in the ‘second-best zero-proﬁts’
policy,7 avoids such a deﬁcit, but at the expense of a lower relative eﬃciency
(o ¼ 0:783), and by setting a higher toll. In fact, the numerical value of the
toll t, as well as the ﬂow/capacity ratio and therewith the average user cost
c, are equal to their ﬁrst-best counterparts. The intuition is that, under the
constraint that the new capacity be self-ﬁnancing, the best thing to do is to
set capacity at a level that implies the minimisation of average social cost
(user cost and capacity cost combined). Equilibrium route choice behaviour
implies that this also minimises the average user cost on the initial capacity,
given that new capacity should be self-ﬁnancing. Therefore, the sum of the
average costs that can be aﬀected (all social cost components except capital
cost of the initial capacity) is minimised, and because the generalised price
faced by travellers is equal to the resulting average cost level, the social sur-
plus is maximised. In this equilibrium, we are therefore adding new capacity
according to the long-run cost function — using a social cost-minimising
ratio of traﬃc ﬂow and capacity, and a toll and a generalised price that
would also apply in the long-run ﬁrst-best optimum.
The ﬁnal benchmark involves ‘maximum added capacity (zero-proﬁts)’,
where again the initial capacity is assumed to remain untolled. This equili-
brium is included because it identiﬁes the maximum level of new capacity
that one could expect when a zero-proﬁt constraint applies, either because
proﬁt-exhausting auctions are used or because free entry of road operators
continues until proﬁts are exhausted. In this equilibrium, relative eﬃciency
o is, not surprisingly, below the level under ‘second-best zero-proﬁts’:
0.643. The toll t on the tolled capacity, as well as the generalised price,
exceeds the ﬁrst-best level because we are no longer operating along the
long-run cost function.
The values presented in Table 1 are the relevant benchmarks against
which to assess the values of key variables at various stages during the
three regimes of interest, ‘free entry’, ‘auctions’ and ‘second-best zero-
proﬁt entries’. This is what we will do in the next section.
7It is perhaps important to note the diﬀerence between the ‘second-best zero-proﬁts entries’ regime
introduced in the previous section, and the ‘second-best zero-proﬁts’ benchmark discussed here. The
former imposes a zero-proﬁt constraint on newly added capacity on one of the two segments a or b,
keeping capacity at the other segment ﬁxed. This leads to a sequence of capacity additions — alter-
nately on segments a and b, as we will see shortly. The ‘second-best zero-proﬁts’ benchmark
equilibrium in Table 1, in contrast, allows for a simultaneous optimisation of newly added (tolled)
capacities on both segments. After optimisation, there is of course no scope for further zero-proﬁt
capacity additions, so this benchmark involves a single static equilibrium, not a sequence.
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4.0 Simulation Results
4.1 Patterns of entry and network growth
A ﬁrst property of interest of the three regimes concerns the pattern of
entries, which is characterised not only by the speciﬁc order of additions
to segments a and b, respectively, but also by the identity of the ﬁrm that
makes the investment. For the free-entry regime in our numerical model,
we ﬁnd a very regular pattern of entries, where in every odd ‘round’ a
new ﬁrm enters on segment a, while in the even round that follows, an addi-
tion to segment b is made by that same ﬁrm (given the assumed symmetry in
the network we can, without loss of generality, assign the label a to the
segment to which the ﬁrst ﬁrm makes the ﬁrst addition).
Although this pattern is not the only possible equilibrium sequence
under free entry,8 there is a good economic intuition for why it should be
a plausible pattern. After the ﬁrst investment on segment a, by a ﬁrm
that we will refer to as ﬁrm I (ﬁrms will be numbered consecutively by
roman numbers in order of entry), it is plausible that segment b is more
attractive to enter for a new entrant (ﬁrm II) than segment a, because
there will be less competition and a smaller aggregate capacity on segment
b than on a. It is also immediately clear that segment bmust be more attrac-
tive than segment a for ﬁrm I: we do not expect a possible proﬁtable invest-
ment on segment a for ﬁrm I if it already optimised the toll and capacity of
its added capacity on segment a in round 1. Finally, the incumbent ﬁrm I
will enjoy a higher proﬁt increase from adding capacity to segment b
than a new entrant does, because ﬁrm I can maximise the joint proﬁts on
both segments, while a new entrant II will end up in a situation of serial
competition with the incumbent I. Therefore, in round 2, it is plausible
that ﬁrm I should add capacity to segment b.
Next, when ﬁrm I optimises its link on segment b in round 2, the capa-
city on segment a is larger than was the capacity on segment b when that
same ﬁrm I optimised its ﬁrst investment, on segment a. As a result, it is
likely that it chooses a larger capacity for its link on segment b in round
2, than for its link on segment a in round 1. A potential new entrant will,
in round 3, therefore ﬁnd segment a more attractive to enter than segment
b; but also the incumbent ﬁrm I would prefer investing on segment a over
segment b in round 3, as it has just optimised its link on segment b. The
question therefore is this: will a new entrant II foresee greater proﬁts
from investing in segment a than the proﬁt increase expected by the
8For a diﬀerent parameterisation of the numerical model, for example, we found three successive entries
by the ﬁrst ﬁrm entering, on segments a, b, and then again a.
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incumbent ﬁrm I? This cannot be said with certainty. The incumbent ﬁrm
has the advantage that it can avoid competition between links on segment
a, so it is likely to end up with higher tolls. But the incumbent ﬁrm has the
disadvantage that new capacity will reduce demand for its earlier capacity
on segment a. It imposes, as it were, a pecuniary externality upon the proﬁt-
ability of its own earlier capacity. The incumbent ﬁrmwill take into account
the implied fall in proﬁts on its earlier capacity, a loss that a new entrant
will not face. Depending on which of these two eﬀects dominate, it may
be the incumbent or a new entrant who invests on segment a in round 3.
In our numerical model, it is the new entrant, whom we will refer to as
ﬁrm II.
Finally, in round 4, there are six possible entries to consider: the incum-
bent ﬁrms I and II and a new entrant may each add capacity to segments a
or b. Because the aggregate capacity is now larger on segment a while the
tolls are lower, each of these ﬁrms would prefer an investment on segment
b. The comparison between the proﬁt gains for ﬁrms I and II involves the
same trade-oﬀ as just described for round 3, and also for round 4 it results
in a net advantage for ﬁrm II in our numerical model. The comparison
between ﬁrm II and a new entrant, ﬁrm III, involves the same trade-oﬀ
as described above for round 2, and again it results in a net advantage
for ﬁrm II. Firm II therefore invests in segment b in round 4.
This pattern of new ﬁrms entering on segment a in an odd round and,
after that, on segment b in the succeeding even round, is maintained in
our numerical model as far as we have tested it (four ﬁrms; eight
rounds). As stated, this pattern is not the only possible equilibrium
sequence, but it is a likely pattern because of the considerations and
trade-oﬀs sketched above. Because it results in a conﬁguration with parallel
competition on both segments, it suggests that the ineﬃcient pattern of
serial monopolists studied by Small and Verhoef (2007), with a single
monopolist on each serial segment, will not easily arise spontaneously, in
its pure form, as the outcome of free entry of road providers. At the
same time, because road users can switch between road providers at the
intersection halfway between the two segments in our model, an operator
that sets its toll on the one segment is likely to consider the tolls on most
of the links on the other segment as given, so it remains to be seen whether
the resulting tolls tend towards the competitive level, as suggested by the
degree of parallel competition on both segments individually, or to a
higher level, as suggested by the persisting pattern of serial competition
between segments. We will, of course, turn to this question shortly.
First, we will discuss the pattern of network formation under a sequence
of auctions. This pattern appears to be identical to the one just described
(although the capacities and tolls will be diﬀerent): there are alternate
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additions to segments a and b (again, we can freely label the segment of the
ﬁrst addition as segment a). As discussed in Section 2.3, the patronage-
maximising auction forces bidders to operate with zero proﬁts along the
long-run cost function. After a winning bid has been implemented on, for
example, segment a, it is therefore impossible to make a further expansion
on that segment without running into losses. Hence, if a next bid is made, it
must be on segment b; and because the expansion just made on segment a
raises demand, it will generally be possible to make such a bid, involving a
positive patronage and capacity. The sequence will thus have alternating
additions to segments a and b.
An important diﬀerence with the free-entry regime is that, under the
auctions regime, the identity of the ﬁrms entering is immaterial. The
reason is that the bidders set tolls according to the long-run cost function
(at a level of 2.789 in our numerical model; see Table 1), and are restricted
to remain committed to these toll levels also after further additions are
made to the network.
Finally, the same pattern of entries and network formation will arise
under the ‘second-best zero-proﬁt entries’ regime. The intuition is now
even simpler. After having optimised the capacity and toll for a new
addition on segment a, it is by deﬁnition not possible to have a further
improvement in social surpluses by revising the capacity on segment a
once more. If there is scope for improvement, it must be on segment b,
and exactly because the capacities and tolls for both segments are not opti-
mised simultaneously, a sequence will be produced in which there is scope
for improvement on the one segment after an increase in capacity on the
other segment has induced an increase in demand over the full corridor.
4.2 Development of capacities and tolls
Although the pattern of network development is identical for the three
regimes considered, the capacities and tolls involved may, of course, be
diﬀerent. This is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, which show, for the various
regimes and for the two segments a and b separately, the development over
rounds of aggregate capacity (summed over a segment) and average toll
(that is, averaged for tolled users only, so ignoring users on the untolled
initial capacity). The diagrams use two benchmarks: the base equilibrium
and the second-best zero-proﬁt equilibrium, both described in Table 1 —
where the latter is, of course, to be distinguished clearly from the sequence
shown as the second-best zero-proﬁt regime.
Figures 2 and 3 reveal a number of interesting properties of the diﬀerent
regimes. First, it can be noted that the auctions regime and the second-best
zero-proﬁts regime produce identical results. This is not too surprising once
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it is recognised that both induce entries with tolls set according to the long-
run cost function, and the capacity maximised under a zero-proﬁt con-
straint. We can thus conﬁrm that Verhoef’s (2007) ﬁnding that the
patronage-maximising auction produces the second-best zero-proﬁt road
for a ﬁrst auctioned road, on an exogenously determined location in an
exogenously speciﬁed network, remains valid for a sequence of auctions
in a network, which develops in an endogenous manner through these
auctions. (However, it should be recalled that this would change, albeit
in a numerically modest way, if we would allow ﬁrms to make toll bids
that imply structural losses later on.)
Second, both the auctions regime and the free-entry regime appear to
approach the second-best zero-proﬁts equilibrium more closely as the net-
work develops further. For the auctions regime, this is less surprising as it
induces a sequence of additions that are all according to the long-run cost
function — which the second-best zero-proﬁts equilibrium does in one shot
for both segments jointly. For free entry, the beneﬁcial impacts of increased
Figure 2
The Development of Aggregate Capacity per Segment over Time under Various Regimes
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parallel competition apparently outweigh the potential caveat that serial
competition remains in existence. The reason is that new ﬁrms will
remain entering a segment as long as the generalised price is above the
long-run optimal level. A combination of capacity and toll that brings
the ﬂow capacity ratio on the new link equal to the optimal level, and the
generalised price to the level provided by the parallel competitors, would
then produce a proﬁt — and would therefore induce entry — until the
long-run optimal generalised price level is achieved.
Third, Figure 2 shows that although both sequences have investments
that for both segments become smaller over successive rounds, the initial
steps are bigger for the auctions regime. That regime also approaches the
second-best zero-proﬁt toll level much more rapidly; that is, already from
the ﬁrst capacity addition onwards. For the free-entry regime, the average
toll approaches that level only gradually. Note that this decline in tolls is
not monotonous: the average toll drops on a segment in a round in
which a new ﬁrm enters that segment, due to increased competition and
Figure 3
The Development of the Weighted Average Toll (for Tolled Users) per Segment over
Time under Various Regimes
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to increased aggregate capacity, but it rises when an investment is made on
the other segment, due to the induced increase in demand.
4.3 Development of social surplus
Given that tolls take on the second-best zero-proﬁt levels immediately, and
capacities approach those levels more rapidly, it should be no surprise that
social surplus rises more rapidly under the auctions regime than with free-
entry. Figure 4 shows this by comparing the relative eﬃciency for both
regimes. One possible conclusion from the diagram is that there is actually
no need to interfere in entries into the market through the auctioning of
concessions, because a process of free entry leads to the same ﬁnal end-
state, namely the second-best zero-proﬁt state. Quite a diﬀerent conclusion
would be that such auctioning is in fact desirable, since the free-entry
regime gets suﬃciently close to this second-best zero-proﬁt equilibrium
only after a suﬃcient number of competing ﬁrms have entered the
market, each with relatively small capacities, which might be unrealistic
in reality if discreteness of capacity is an issue. It is illustrative that the
Figure 4
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surplus level achieved already in round 2 with auctions, is under free entry
not reached until three ﬁrms have entered on both segments in six rounds.
Similarly, the welfare gains achieved after two rounds with free entry
are only around half of those realised through auctions. These results
suggest that the equivalence in the theoretical end-states should not
be over-emphasised, and that there may still be a convincing case for
preferring auctions over free entry.
One might wonder whether it is possible to speed up the increase in
welfare in the free-entry regime by regulating entry, by assigning the
right to enter in a round to a speciﬁc ﬁrm on a speciﬁc segment, leaving
the capacity and toll at the discretion of the ﬁrm. This might oﬀer a
second-best instrument that could raise welfare during this regime. It tran-
spires that in the present network, there is no scope for raising welfare this
way. In every round studied, it appeared that the speciﬁc investment that
implies the highest possible proﬁt gain for the investor (that is, the highest
gain among those from the 2  F þ 2 possible investments when F ﬁrms are
present in the network) is also the investment that leads to the highest gain
in social surplus — given that the potential investors themselves choose
their tolls and capacities. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows for
rounds 2 to 8 the 2  F þ 2 combinations of the change in proﬁt for the
potential investor (along the horizontal axis), and the implied change in
Figure 5
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social surplus. In each round shown, the combination with the highest
proﬁt gain also has the highest social surplus gain, and the rank correlation
is nearly perfect.9
Again, there is a good economic intuition for this result. Investments are
especially proﬁtable on a segment that has a relatively limited number of
competitors, and therefore relatively high tolls, and a relatively low aggre-
gate capacity, and therefore a relatively high potential for further growth in
demand. Both factors would cause another investment to be desirable also
from the social perspective, because increased competition will drive down
tolls towards socially more desirable levels, and because the investment
implies extra capacity, which is socially desirable as long as proﬁts are posi-
tive. Furthermore, each ﬁrm’s attempt to reduce serial competition by
having capacity on both segments also contributes to social welfare in
the sense that it avoids ‘pure’ serial competition as considered in the
model of Small and Verhoef (2007), where each segment is controlled by
a diﬀerent single operator.
4.4 Development of proﬁtability
Finally, we discuss how proﬁtability of road operations evolves over time.
It is instructive to distinguish between proﬁtability at the level of segments,
and at the level of ﬁrms.
Figure 6 shows the development of aggregate proﬁtability for both
segments under the various regimes (on added, tolled capacity only, so
ignoring the cost of initial capacity). For the free-entry regime, the patterns
show how, after the ﬁrst ﬁrm I has invested, every following entry reduces
aggregate proﬁts for the segment on which the investment is made due to
increased competition, while it raises proﬁts on the other segment due to
increased equilibrium demand. The trend towards zero proﬁts on tolled
capacity is clearly visible, although, in accordance with the toll levels
depicted in Figure 3 above, proﬁts are still positive with four ﬁrms present.
Perhaps surprisingly, also under the auctions regime — which, of course,
again coincides with the second-best zero-proﬁt regime in Figure 6 —
proﬁts are temporarily made, although each investment yields zero proﬁts
in the round it is implemented. These proﬁts result from the interactions
between the two segments: a new investment in round i that produces
zero proﬁts upon completion will become proﬁtable after the capacity on
9It is striking how, in Figure 5, the relation between the gain in proﬁts for the investor and the gain in
social surplus appears to be rather stable across rounds. It is not hard to imagine the course of a well-
ﬁtted square root type of function for the pooled observations; it is less easy to come up with an expla-
nation for this closeness.
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the other segment, and hence overall equilibrium demand, is increased in
round i þ 1.10
Figure 7 shows proﬁts by ﬁrm in the free-entry regime. For each ﬁrm,
aggregate proﬁts increase with an own — voluntary — investment, and
decrease as other ﬁrms add capacity. Not surprisingly, the earlier the ﬁrm
enters, the higher will its temporary proﬁts be. As the network expands,
proﬁts evaporate. The negative impact of later entries upon a ﬁrm’s proﬁts
creates another problem for more traditional bid-based auctions, where the
concession is given to the ﬁrm that makes the highest bid. A myopic ﬁrm
would bid the net present value of proﬁts ignoring later entries, and
would therefore suﬀer losses as soon as further additions to the network
Figure 6
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10It is exactly this mechanism that might induce a ﬁrm with capacity on the one segment to bid a toll
below the long-run ﬁrst-best level for capacity on the other segment: this may maximise the ﬁrm’s
temporary joint proﬁts over both segments together, at the expense of future losses. We discussed
this possibility in Section 2.3, and explained that it is numerically insigniﬁcant in the present network.
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are made. However, even if the ﬁrm is more forward-looking, the bid it can
make will depend crucially on the assumptions it makes on the time lags
between future auctions, something that may be hard to predict also for
the regulator. This adds to the more fundamental problem with bid-
based auctions already identiﬁed in Verhoef (2007), namely that it urges
a ﬁrm to choose the proﬁt-maximising combination of capacity and toll,
rather then the welfare-maximising levels.
5.0 Conclusions
This paper studied the eﬃciency impacts of private toll roads in initially
untolled networks. The analysis allowed for capacity and toll choice by
private operators, and endogenised entry and therewith the degree of
competition, distinguishing and allowing for both parallel and serial com-
petition. Two institutional arrangements were considered, namely one in
which entry is free and one in which it is allowed only after winning an
auction. Investments were assumed to be made sequentially. With free
entry, the ﬁrm expecting the highest proﬁts enters, and with auctions a
Figure 7
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concession is granted to the ﬁrm that promises to carry the highest traﬃc
ﬂow. The following results stand out.
First, the existence of serial competition does not alter the conclusion
obtained by DeVany and Saving (1980) and Engel et al. (2004) in the
context of parallel competition, namely that entry of more ﬁrms drives
tolls closer towards socially optimal levels. This is true despite the
potentially negative eﬀects that increased serial competition might have
on the eﬃciency of pricing (Small and Verhoef, 2007). The reason is that,
with endogenous entries, ﬁrms will be ordered over the network such that
they occupy capacity on diﬀerent (serial) segments, and this minimises
the excessive-pricing problem that may otherwise characterise network
markets with serial competition, identiﬁed by Economides and Salop
(1992). During the process of entries, neither the size of investments nor
the tolls are chosen optimally from the social perspective, but capacity
‘deﬁcits’ will be ﬁlled up when later investments are made by other ﬁrms,
and tolls will be driven down under increased competition.
Second, both sequences considered — the free-entry regime and the
auctions regime — have the second-best zero-proﬁt equilibrium as the
end-state of the equilibrium sequence of investments. However, the auc-
tions regime approaches this end-state more rapidly: tolls are set equal to
their second-best zero-proﬁt levels immediately, and capacity additions in
the earlier rounds are bigger. When discreteness of capacity is relevant
and limits the number of investments that can practically be accommodated,
the auctions regime may therefore result in a more eﬃcient end-state, with a
higher social surplus, although the theoretical end-state is the same as under
free entry. Consistent with ﬁndings for the single patronage-maximising
auction in Verhoef (2007), in each round of the auctions sequence, ﬁrms
are pushed towards bids that imply investment and tolling according to
the long-run cost function.
Obviously, the model is still rather abstract, and various important
extensions can be envisaged. We name a few, and will also hypothesise
whether relaxation of the associated assumption is likely to change this
paper’s main conclusions.
First, we considered a rather simple network structure, and also did not
allow ﬁrms to make fundamental changes to this structure, for example, by
adding a direct link between the origin and destination. It would be inter-
esting to consider more general networks in future work.Will this make any
fundamental change to the results? The most fundamental change con-
sidered in this paper compared to earlier studies with free entry, namely
the inclusion of serial competition besides parallel competition, did not
undermine the eﬃciency of free entry — contrary to what one might
have expected. Also, the eﬃciency of auctions was not aﬀected by having
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parallel and serial links auctioned. Of course, as also demonstrated in
Verhoef (2007), when a bigger network allows us to develop a Braess para-
dox, things may change drastically. Besides such cases, however, it is not
clear why a bigger network would aﬀect the conclusions fundamentally
— although this question, of course, needs to be investigated formally.
The main arguments underlying the eﬃciency of free entry and of auctions,
as discussed above, seem to remain relevant also in bigger networks.
Second, there is the issue of the timing of investments. Especially in the
free-entry regime, this may lead to a complicated dynamic game, where
ﬁrms not only decide on where to invest and by how much, but also on
when to do so. Developing the analytical framework to describe this
properly seems a big challenge, even when demand functions are assumed
to be stable over time; but will it change the main conclusions? Perhaps not.
The prospect of potential proﬁts for new ﬁrms, that exists as long as equili-
brium tolls exceed the second-best zero-proﬁt level, will induce entry
whether or not that entry is optimally timed. In other words, although
the outcomes along the free-entry sequence are likely to be diﬀerent with
endogenous timing of investments, the endpoint is likely to be the same.
As much can be expected for the auctions regime.
Third, nearly-myopic behaviour when deciding on the size of invest-
ments could be replaced by a less naive formation of expectations. Again
it is likely that the outcomes along the free-entry sequence will change,
but questionable whether the endpoint will be diﬀerent. A conﬁguration
with positive proﬁts is unlikely to be a stable endpoint, so also, then, can
one expect entry to make the system converge to the second-best zero-
proﬁt equilibrium.
Fourth, we ignored that in reality, the government may be under pres-
sure to add capacity itself at some point in a sequence of additions, parti-
cularly if either tolls seem excessive or congestion is severe. The paper
did make clear, however, that a suﬃciently patient government has a
good reason not to do so, since these are also the conditions under which
private investments are more likely.
Fifth, the links in our model were identical in terms of length. For an
asymmetric network, patronage may have to be weighted with link length
in the auction. For free-entry, a relatively short link with a relatively
large ﬂow may be particularly attractive when capacity expansion costs
are relatively low. Asymmetries therefore pose interesting questions for
further development of the ideas presented above.
Of course, it is not diﬃcult to mention some further extensions that may
aﬀect the main conclusions. These include the consideration of hetero-
geneous users, making product diﬀerentiation between parallel operators
a likely outcome; the consideration of demand uncertainty; the existence
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of strategic interactions and market power during auctions; and the
replacement of Nash behaviour by Stackelberg leadership in the toll
and/or capacity stages of the free-entry game. Future research should
inform us of how strongly such changes would aﬀect the model’s main
conclusions.
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